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	Washington, D. C. 2050S	19
	DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGIENCE	
	20 July 1984	
	SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO NAMIBIA	
,	Summary	2
great end settlemen however, considera settlemen economic statement intended eventual its liking	ir judgment the financial burden of Namibia and to compel Pretoria to seek a quick politic. The territory's financial drain is increased although we do not believe that financial tions alone will determine South Africa's design we expect Namibia will become a much large liability. We believe Prime Minister Botha's about the heavy financial burden of Namibia to prepare white South Africans for the terrindependence should Pretoria negotiate a set of the lemonstrate Pretoria's sincerity and self-informatical process.	ical asing, l sire for a er a are itory's clement to outside

This typescript memorar	dum was requested by	Deputy Director fo
Southern African Affair	s, Bureau of Africa Affair	rs, Department of State. It
was prepared by	Southern Africa Branc	
Latin American Analysis	 Comments and queries ma 	ay be directed to the Chief
Southern Africa Branch,		
		ALA M 84-10070

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Budgetary and Other I	inancial Support to Nam	nibia	
press reports. This subsidies, a 90-millithe parastatal South million rand in subsidies.	inancial support in fisfigure includes 318 milon on rand loss on the ope African Transport Servidies on Namibian imports	about 460 million rand* in cal year 1985,** according to lion rand in direct budgetary rations in the territory of ces and an estimated 50 s. Pretoria also may provide s, but we do not have such	
in fiscal year 1985 we South African economic includes the 460 mill government budget of in customs and excise	urope, claimed that Sou ill total 658 million ra c writers have concluded ion rand cited above (ou	ut of a total South African pproximately 200 million rand uth Africa on behalf of	
Security Costs			
(SADF) cost his gover 1984. We do not have judgment, however, So this expense for its Moreover, there would defense installations	ia operations of the Soument between 400 and 50 the data to prove or disthibuted by would be start-up costs associations the South African in Namibia operations rep	iated with establishing now	
One rand equals US \$0	.68 as of 17 July 1984.		25
* Namibia's 1985 fisca	l year is from 1 April 1	1984 to 31 March 1985.	25
** Pretoria allocates ustoms Union duties bas frica. According to pr	Namibia a 250-million ra ed on the Namibian impor	and share of Southern African rts that come through South	
	e represents a substay.	•	
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Foreign Eychango Ronofits and Othon Domittaness	
Foreign Exchange Benefits and Other Remittances	
In addition to South Africa's political and military interests in Namibia, it has an important economic stake. Pretoria earns foreign exchange from Namibia's exports, at least two-thirds of which flow through South African ports. While the amount fluctuates according to market conditions, Namibia exported over 900 million rand worth of goods in 1981,	25X1
the last year for which data are available. South Africa keeps most of	
the foreign exchange from these exports and remits the earnings to Namibia in rand.*	25X1
in rand."	
The South African economy also receives an inflow of royalties,	
profits, dividends, and worker remittances from Namibia. The magnitude	
also fluctuates, but we estimate that it topped 400 million rand during	25X1
the late 1970s.	2371
Trends	
The size of Pretoria's direct budgetary contribution to Namibia has grown dramatically beginning in fiscal year 1982 (see Table 1). Nearly half of the increase in that year reflected changes in the accounting format for South African assistance to Namibia. Pretoria transferred to Windhoek certain spending obligations for items such as police and defense that previously did not appear in Windhoek's budget. Aside from this accounting change, the South African contribution has grown as domestic Namibian revenues have declined and Windhoek has had to increase its expenditures to support 11 ethnic, second-tier administrations established by Pretoria. Civil service salaries alone account for 60 percent of current expenditures in the Namibian budget.	25x1
Namibian internal revenue has slumped primarily because of drought and depressed export prices. Real gross domestic product fell by 2 percent last year. The contribution of mining, fishing and agriculture to gross domestic product dropped from 43 percent in 1982 to 34 percent in 1983, with a corresponding reduction in tax revenues. Taxes on the diamond industry, for example, contributed over half of total domestic revenue four years ago, but a fall in world diamond prices was largely responsible for lowering this share to 14 percent by fiscal year 1984. Prospects for a significant recovery of domestic revenues seem slender because, in our judgment, the markets for diamonds, uranium and lead probably will remain fairly soft over the next couple of years.	25X1
* Part of the foreign exchange is used to purchase imports for Namibia, but	
most Namibian imports originate in South Africa and do not require foreign	25X1
exchange.	2 7/11

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TABLE 1
South Africa's Direct Subsidies for the Namibian Budget

Figure Verms (and in a March)		25X1
Fiscal Years (ending March)	Amount of Subsidy (Rand Millions)	
1981	80.0	
1982	254.0	
1983	200.0	
1984	240.8	
1985	<u> </u>	25X1

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The Debt Problem. The deterioration of Namibian finances has raised Windhoek's outstanding debt from 10.5 million rand in March 1979 to 690 million rand in February 1984.* Interest and capital repayment from the Namibian budget will grow from 74 million rand in fiscal year 1984 to 93 million rand in fiscal year 1985 and may reach 180 million rand by fiscal year 1987, according to press reports. In the absence of a significant economic recovery in Namibia, this growing debt service will necessitate much larger South African subsidies.

Moreover, South Africa has unconditionally guaranteed the debt accumulated since 1966 and potentially will be held accountable for at least 690 million rand should an independent government repudiate the debt.** The potential future burden grows larger each day that the issue of Namibian independence remains unresolved. South Africa has continued to guarantee loans to Namibia in the hope that other parties will bear some portion of this repayment burden after Namibian independence. In this way South Africa is keeping down the size of its current budgetary support to Namibia.

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^{*} We believe that virtually all of this debt has been raised in South Africa and presumably would be repaid in rand, not in foreign exchange. According to data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Namibia has outstanding debt of some \$30 million to banks in BIS member countries.

^{**} An International Court of Justice opinion of 1971 states that from the time of the revocation of its mandate in 1966, South Africa has had no authority to grant economic rights or create economic claims in respect to Namibia. An independent Namibia might decide therefore that a repudiation of this debt need not call into question its intent to honor its own debts, and thus need not close off credit. Resolution of the debt issue could become an important point in future negotiations for Namibian independence.

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO NAMIBIA Distribution: Original - Edward Fugit, Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State Frederick L. Wettering, Director African Affairs, NSC 1 Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs 1 Peter Lande, Director, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State 1 Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary 1 (National Security), Department of the Treasury 1 Byron Jackson, Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of Commerce 1 SA/DCI/IA 1 Executive Director NIO/Africa 1 NIC --DDO/Africa 1 DDI --1 ADDI

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